THE AGE OF CHANCE
Jerome G. Manis, Ph.D.
Early one morning in March, 2003, my wife called to me while we were
snorkeling in Hanauma Bay, a Honolulu maritime preserve. Near her was
something new in this place--a small sea horse. Only nine inches long, it
was our only sea horse sighting in about fifteen years here.
What¹s so great about a small sea horse? We often see turtles, octopuses,
eels, and many varieties of colorful tropical fish. To me, the sea horse
was not just an unexpected sight. Most interesting to me was that no one
had any idea where it had come from or how it had gotten here.
The origin of this specific sea horse currently is not known and likely not
knowable. That is far less important than winning a multi-million dollar
lottery or being struck by lightning. What they have in common is the focus
of this report--chance. There is modern scientific recognition of such
unknowable causes of occurrences.
A few centuries ago, scientists would not have accepted unknowability as an
answer to questions. Determinism was the common explanation. However, we
live in an age of chance when scholars are aware of uncertainty and
unpredictability in the world around them.
Having had a long time concern with chance occurrences, that was my
immediate thought about the sea horse and a chance stimulus for my current
investigation. Over the years, I have had many surprising experiences.
Sometimes favorable. Also, I have studied many reports about chance and
several of my articles about it have been published in professional
journals.
My renewed interest in chance was spurred again a few days later by a
newspaper article about an unusual earlier storm. In 1997, Hurricane Nora
moved north with 70 mile per hour winds from Baja California. Over the
succeeding years, it was learned that the storm had lofted sea salt and
ocean plankton into ice crystals of clouds far into America¹s heartland.
Was that a chance incident or merely a stronger than usual hurricane?
To answer such a question, we need to know exactly what is meant by
³chance.² Many other terms are tied to it--luck, providence, quantum and
chaos theories, etc. The term luck has long been a popular one and
providence has been a religious explanation. However, chance has an
important connection to 20th century science and with statistical analysis.
Drawing upon such scientific usage, we can justify saying that chance refers
only to events which occur without any known or knowable explanation.
Chance occurrences are those for which causes have not and will not be
found. Referring to this age of chance demonstrates the immensity of the
changeover from the past age of certainty.
There is growing evidence of chance. The 20th century has brought chance
into the scientific vocabulary along with related terms. Among them are
indeterminacy, probability, uncertainty, and unpredictability. All may be
described as markers of a new scientific outlook.
Still, those words have been disturbing to scholars and non-scholars alike.
For Einstein, a major contributor to their emergence, those terms urged him
to disprove them. Fears of uncertainty and unpredictability on Wall Street
drives down the price of stocks and endangers the world economy.
To say this is not to deny the truth and accuracy of much evidence from long
ago scientific efforts. Much of today¹s world is founded upon firm
discoveries dating back many centuries. Deterministic discoveries will
continue. That chance occurrences--of unknown or unknowable sources--are
related to all that and more also deserves to be recognized. Especially for
their effects on all of us.
The aim here is to avoid exaggeration of chance but not to ignore it. What
is needed is a good look at the basic evidence for and against it. My
training was to find ways to replace any appearances of chance or luck with
certainty and predictability. Yet, many of my important experiences have
been unexpected and unpredictable. Others have said the same.
My interest in chance began many years ago during my military service. In
many unit areas, tables for poker were a regular event on pay days. I had
rarely gambled before. Still, I was very lucky and often won considerably.
A fellow soldier who had been a civilian gambler told me that while I was
quite lucky, I knew nothing about poker. He also gave me some good advice,
surely familiar to experienced gamblers.
³Don¹t draw to an inside straight in draw poker.² ³In stud poker, usually
don¹t bet on a low hole card.² ³Watch the expressions on other player¹s
faces to get an idea of their cards.² ³Luck is not enough.² ³Never gamble
if you aren¹t getting good cards.² And much more.
When I returned to the United States, I found that my winning streak was
suddenly over. Since those days, I have rarely gambled because I usually
have lost. My gambler friend had told me that he gambled because he was
lucky and when his luck ³ran out² he would find another occupation. But why
does luck run out? No one knows. Or will know.
³Gambling² and ³luck² sensitized me to ³chance,² but they are not the same.
Some gambling involves skill and experience, as well as unknown or
unknowable possibilities. Luck is a common usage merely referring to
unexpected favorable or unfavorable outcomes. Only if unknown or unknowable
causes are involved should they be called chance. Indeed that is its
scientific root, notably beginning just over 100 years ago.
Upon returning to college, I majored in sociology in which I eventually
received a Ph.D. degree from Columbia University. I was taught that
sociologists should use statistics to seek ³invariable correlations which
could NOT have occurred by chance.² Chance was taught as something to be
ruled out, not examined. Here, chance is being viewed as something that
deserves to be looked at instead of being excluded. Modern science now
tells us that chance and its corollaries exist and can affect us.
Courses in statistics long have offered ways to measure the likelihood of
chance occurrences. For centuries, statisticians have been developing
techniques for judging events in terms of their ³probability.² Tossing a
coin one hundred times will have an average probability of about fifty heads
and fifty tails. Great variations in those frequencies will be found when
many hundred sets of coin tosses are done.
Comparing the statistical averages on test scores of two different groups
can clarify the extent of their similarity or difference. To say that the
averages of their test scores differ at the five percent level indicates a
low probability of chance causes. An outcome at the one percent level shows
an even lower likelihood of chance.
Despite my occasional reservations about such usages, I followed the usual
academic route: teaching in universities, directing a sociological research
center, receiving federal grants for research, studying mental illness,
alcoholism, migrants, education, and other topics. I presented papers at
sociology meetings and published statistical analyses in academic journals.
Still, I kept encountering odd, unpredictable events in my private life as
well as my studies.
One such personal example involved a chance invitation (including
transportation) to a party in Evanston, Illinois while I was working on my
master¹s degree at the University of Chicago. Since I did not have a car, a
girl at the party gave me the name of her girl friend who worked at the
university. I called her soon afterward and married her about six months
later. We have been married 54 years. Friends have told similar tales.
Another long and complex series of possibly chance events followed my
post-doctoral interview at Hunter College in New York City. I was
interviewed and told I was being approved to the administration. Meanwhile,
I had been offered and accepted a summer appointment at Central Michigan
College in Mt. Pleasant, Michigan my home state. The position had become
open when the expected instructor had canceled to accept a Fulbright
appointment to the Philippines.
Before leaving for the summer assignment, I learned that the Fulbright
appointee had left an opening at Western Michigan College in Kalamazoo,
Michigan. I decided to visit there while enroute to my summer position. I
was so attracted by the chairman, the college, and the town with its many
amenities that I accepted their offer and withdrew my Hunter application.
When the Fulbrighter returned to Kalamazoo, we became good friends. Their
many artifacts, which included an outrigger canoe for their lake house, were
fascinating. We met many of their Filipino visitors and a few years later,
I applied for and received my own Fulbright professorship to the
Philippines. It had never been an interest of mine.
After retirement to Hawaii, I attended a political meeting where I heard one
of the speakers talk about demographics, ethnic blocs, and other familiar
terms. After the meeting, I asked him if he was a sociologist. George
Simson was professor of English and director of the journal Biography at the
University of Hawaii. When I told him that biography was one of my
interests and that I had read all five volumes of Leon Edel¹s biography of
Henry James, he invited me to his office for a bag lunch.
During one of our many succeeding luncheons together, I brought up my
interest in chance. He could not recall any such a topic in biographies and
suggested that I check out the relevant literature in biography theory. Not
finding any, I decided to prepare such a report.
Then, attending some of his ³brown bag seminars², I presented a lecture on
³The Aleatory Element in Biography.² That term had been used by one of the
founders of sociology to refer to luck. It was well received and was later
published in the journal Biography. That publication stirred me to
investigate this phenomenon further.
A more sociological report ³Chance in Human Affairs² was soon submitted
(with Bernard Meltzer) to a major journal, but rejected by the editor as a
topic not worthy of publication. We then resubmitted it to ³Sociological
Theory² where it was published. To me, many of those experiences seemed
unexpected and unpredictable--possibly chance outcomes.
How others are affected by chance occurrences is evidenced in Laura
Hillenbrand¹s ³A Sudden Illness: How my life changed² in ³The New Yorker²
(7/07/03). It affected me deeply because my daughter has been an even
longer victim of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. She too was not treated by
physicians who said she was mentally ill. Two psychiatrists said that my
daughter should be in a mental hospital despite her flaming sore throats,
high temperatures, and other symptoms. Not known is the cause of CFS.
Could it be unknowable?
The case for chance cannot be based on personal experiences. Instead, it
will draw upon a century of evidence--the entire 20th century. It goes
against 300 years of research from the 17th through the 19th centuries.
During those years, determinism and predictability were the standard.
Then, and even now, providence was a common theological explanation of
unexpected experiences. The will of God was preached in the pulpit and
explained everywhere else. For the rarer unbelievers there was only good or
bad luck. For most, this was an age of certainty not chance.
Luck was the widespread interpretation of gambling outcomes, as it still is.
By the 17th century, mathematicians were describing the outcomes of gambling
as distributions and probabilities. The bell shaped curve was a way of
describing ³normal distributions.² Although probability became widely known
as a statistic, it was not used by early scientists who sought to find the
God-given fixed and eternal laws of nature.
The search for these laws of nature began very notably during the 17th
century. Histories of science reveal a gradual increase in the names of
contributing scientists along with their discoveries. Of that, there can be
no argument. The basic issues have been where and why.
Evidence for the where could begin with the 1645 creation of the Royal
Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge. Charles II granted its
charter in 1662 as the Royal Society. That formation marks an early
institutionalization of the scientific enterprise. Its success is evident
in the rapid growth of its members and their scientific output.
More evidence of the where can be found in the same era by comparing science
in Protestant Scotland with Catholic Ireland. Of the two countries, the
population of Ireland was larger than that of Scotland. Yet, Scotland then
had 21 outstanding scientists while Ireland had only one.
Criticisms have been made of a possible ³Protestant bias.² After all, the
famed 17th century Galileo was Catholic. Unlike Protestants, he was forced
to recant his beliefs. Protestant beliefs have been shown to be very
favorable to the foundations of the scientific culture.
Neglect of non-Western world pioneers in science also has been cited as a
possible flaw in past reports about the rise of science. While it is not
possible to deal with the many Chinese. Hindu, or Islamic science
innovators, such evidence is not large. Nor does it greatly diminish the
centrality of the Protestant ethic to the development of science.
R. H. Tawney and Max Weber revealed many links between the growth of
Protestantism and capitalism, but they also noted their connection to the
rise of science. Protestant-science links specifically were documented by
the recently deceased Robert Merton. The 1970 book based on his doctoral
dissertation pointed out that many founders of science from the 17th century
onward were Protestants who lived in Great Britain.
Calvinism, Puritanism, and Presbyterianism have been notable for beliefs
consistent with the disciplines of science. Lauded were hard work,
diligence, and reading. Reason devoted to mathematics and ³works of God²
were esteemed highly. An impetus was faith in God while His works were seen
as orderly and understandable.
Especially influential for the early scientists was the Calvinist emphasis
upon predestination. Salvation was seen as predetermined by God and
unalterable by human intention or unforeseen events. Since the natural
world was created by God, it too was perceived as predestined.
This Protestant belief in an orderly, ordained world was a strong image of
the way the world worked. God had created the earth and everything in it.
Since this world was created by God, there was good reason to study it.
Learning the good works of the Lord was moral Protestantism.
Exactly how influential this Protestant belief system may have been cannot
be ascertained. Some of the scientific investigators clearly were strongly
motivated by religion. Even those of lesser religious ties also may have
been influenced by the broad cultural outlook of the times. In any case,
there is the clear coincidence of religion, times, and discoveries.
The aim is show that the scientific perspective began with determinism in
the 17th century and that the opposing standpoint began in the 20th. To do
that, a small number of individuals and discoveries will be mentioned.
Only a few merit remembering for most represent just a limited fraction of a
vast group. They have been included to help ³build the case.²
A major exemplar of the early outlook was the famed Isaac Newton whose
biographies described him as a very devout young man. That religiosity also
is evidenced by his references to divine action by God in his writings.
Describing gravity, he mentioned direct divine intervention. The phrase
³sensorium of God² was linked by him to the concept of space.
Newton¹s Mathematical Principles placed order and certainty as central
features of the natural order. Summarizing some of Galileo¹s observations
into a theoretical system, he arrived at his famed three laws of motion. As
laws of motion they are clear confirmations of predictability and
determinism in nature.
Newton¹s views set the stage for what is now called ³classical physics.² A
great number of scholars over several centuries offered support to this
³Newtonian perspective.²
The countless other researches of the 18th and 19th centuries strongly
supported the deterministic perspective. Included among them was the very
shy Henry Cavendish who shunned women. Interested only in his research, he
worked alone in his laboratory on such projects as creating hydrogen gas by
combining metals with acids. In hundreds of experiments, he showed that
air was a constant, invariable entity. Some of his large fortune was the
source of the famed Cavendish laboratory.
John Dalton is most noted for his proposal of atomic weights. He contended
that the various types of atoms had specific, unchangeable weights. Thus he
showed that each atom of oxygen always weighs eight times as much as each
atom of hydrogen to form water.
Another deterministic scientist of this era is Michael Faraday who
discovered how to liquify a variety of different gases by placing them under
pressure. He is also noted for his two laws of electrolysis and for
clarifying the connection between electrolysis and electricity.
These deterministic findings are but a few of the very many by numerous
scientists. Some were more clearcut than others. Very many remain
confirmed and still are applied. Moreover, to say that the age of certainty
has ended means only that an era has ended. The rise of uncertainties will
not end determinism.
Evolutionism may be described in a two-step transition, 19th century
Darwinism and 20th century post Darwinism. The former is somewhat
deterministic, the latter rather indeterminate. In the mid-nineteenth
century, Charles Darwin found a great diversity of finches on his trip to
the Galapagos Islands. Those birds had beaks of all shapes and sizes which
had developed to fit the available variety of niches--evidence of adaptation
to their environment.
Elsewhere, he found similar variations between species in adjacent areas.
Fossils revealed further signs of adaptation, that species evolve from
earlier species. These findings led him to describe the process of natural
selection and the resulting ³survival of the fittest.² His ³Origin of the
Species² set off numerous other investigations supporting his belief that
evolution was a natural, inevitable progression.
During that early period, however, a few scientists had offered uncertain,
irregular findings. Notably, some of them were not English but Italian or
German. In 1811, Amadeo Avogadro¹s study of gases, led him to an
explanation of the importance of atoms. However, his hypothesis about the
relationships between the temperature and pressure of gases had scant effect
upon the scientific certainties of his times.
Nearly a century later, in 1906, chemist Ludwig Boltzman committed suicide
because of the scholarly scorn of his 1898 interpretation of atomic actions.
He developed a statistical, probabilistic version of the then second law of
entropy. He had not learned of the discoveries, shortly after the turn of
the century, that would eventually justify his views.
We may wonder why Avogadro and Boltzman went against the mainstream of the
deterministic science of their times. Perhaps because of the declining
influence of the predestination belief in the Protestant ethic. Also,
possibly, their ideas were not as persuasive and as concerted as those of
the early 20th century.
A related question is why the 20th century was the turning point. There is
no obvious explanation comparable to the predestination-determinism
connection. The prior conjectures may explain the decline of determinism but
not the sharp emergence of its opposites. Was it merely freeing of the
bonds of determinism? Did evolutionism override the religious forces? While
there are few clear answers to such questions, the transformation of
scientific knowledge from certainty to uncertainty is demonstrable.
Innumerable research findings had enriched the sciences throughout the years
prior to the 20th century. Quantum applications have replaced some of them
but many of their contributions still are vital. Currently, space launches
use plans derived from Newton¹s reports about gravity. Still around, also,
is the erroneous image of a ³clockwork universe.²
By the beginning of the 20th century, England¹s predominance in science was
declining. The changeover from classical to modern physics began to include
European scientists. Indeed, many of these great innovators were young
Europeans in their twenties and thirties with fresh new ideas.
The year was 1900 in Germany where 32 year old Max Planck introduced a
mathematical formula that led to quantum theory. It contained the new idea
that energy is not emitted continuously. In opposition to the belief in
orderly processes, Planck asserted that energy was proportional to the
frequency of radiation and was emitted in discrete entities, or quanta.
Quantum mechanics focuses upon such separate entities as the quanta and the
probability, rather than certainty, of their action. That view was soon
supported by others.
Four years later, Albert Einstein then 26 years old published his first
paper about Planck¹s quanta. He contended that light also is not a
continuous wave as it was long believed. Instead, it comes in particles (now
called photons) determined by the light frequency.
In the succeeding years, his reports were published confirming the actual
existence of atoms as well as first proposing his special theory of
relativity Those early publications played a great part in promoting the
emergence of quantum mechanics and its attendant uncertainties.
Einstein¹s evidence suggested that basic physical entities should be
considered as continuously variable rather than fixed and unchangeable. The
specter of unpredictability was now a distinct possibility--totally
different from traditional physics. Despite his reservations, Einstein
continued his many contributions to the quantum perspective.
Others were more prone to accept indeterminism about physical data. One of
them was a young physicist still in his early twenties--Werner Heisenberg.
While others used integers in their mathematics, Heisenberg decided to try
half-integers in complex formats (now called matrices).
One of the controversial aspects of Heisenberg¹s model was that p times q
may not be equal to q times p. The mathematics of that inequality also
suggests that there cannot be certainty about just what p and q really are.
Such aspects of his research led Heisenberg to his ³uncertainty principle.²
To Heisenberg, it was not possible to measure simultaneously both the
position and the momentum of an electron. The more accurately that we are
able to measure the position of the electron, the less we know of its
momentum.
Another blow against determinism is traceable to Erwin Schrodinger. His
theoretical experiment raised basic questions about predictability. Suppose
a cat is placed in a box with a lump of radioactive material some of which
has a 50-50 chance of decaying. The experimenter cannot predict whether the
cat is dead or alive without opening the box.
Since Schrodinger had reservations about the quantum perspective, he is
reported to have said he was sorry that he had anything to do with that
idea. Despite his doubts, the implications of ³Schrodinger¹s cat² for
unpredictability was persuasive.
While the quantum theory was spreading, Einstein kept trying to find ways to
explain away the implications of uncertainty and probabilism. In such
efforts, he made his greatest error. His own equations indicated that the
expansion of the universe might be indeterminate. Since he did not accept
that, he kept trying to find other mathematical explanations.
He proposed an abstruse concept that he called Lambda, a ³cosmological
constant². It appeared to be a simple modification but a few years later a
Russian scientist Alexander Friedmann wrote a major critique. He offered
his mathematical data, which revealed the incongruity of Einstein¹s new
interpretation with his original analysis. Einstein soon conceded his
error.
Friedmann later compared models of types of universe; one of which he
proposed as the likely explanation of the universe. A decade before
astronomers¹ observations confirmed the ³big bang² theory of the universe,
Friedman showed that Einstein¹s general theory of relativity was proof that
the universe must be expanding very rapidly from its very small beginnings.
That view was a very early intimation of chaos theory.
Early in 2003, a young British cosmologist who has carefully described the
Einstein-Friedmann controversy wrote that ³no one knows how to do quantum
cosmology.² The index to Joao Magueijo¹s book ³Faster than the Speed of
Light² does not even contain such words as indeterminism, uncertainty,
probability, or chance.
His aim in that book is to develop a new theory, a very controversial one,
the variable speed of light (VSL). Until now, light has been described as a
constant, moving at 186,000 miles per second. Magueijo notes that Einstein
had shown that light is affected by gravity. His interpretation does not
confirm VSL, but it does question a determinate aspect of science.
Chance, indeterminism, probability, and uncertainty are included in the
index of an earlier book by another Cambridge University astrophysicist John
Gribben. Indeed, he has linked quantum theories to all of them. In his
view, ³The bigger the region we deal with, the more scope there is for
unlikely things to happen someplace, and sometime inside it.²
That view is evident in his 1983 ³In Search of Schrodinger¹s Cat.² He
thoroughly documents the extraordinary explanations which followed the
dead-alive cat paradox. Among them is the theory that both conditions
actually exist, though in separate worlds. Supported by a quantum form of
mathematics, it was first proposed in 1957 and expanded by others into a
multi-world format.
That possibility remains controversial but still appears feasible from the
quantum perspective. Gribben wrote that we can only be certain about our
past but not about what we will know or experience in the future. It now
appears that even the past is not as clear as Darwin interpreted it.
The latter part of the 20th century has brought uncertainty into the
evolutionary perspective. Especially notable in that change has been
Stephen Jay Gould. A prolific writer of books and articles, he has
contended that chance occurrences have been important in the evolutionary
process.
Beginning his career as a paleontologist in the mid-60s, Gould was an
orthodox Darwinian. By the early 1970s, he had begun to raise major
questions about the traditional vision of evolution as a slow and gradual
process. With a aid of a collaborator in 1972, he proposed ³punctuated
equilibria² as a common form of species changes. For the next thirty years
until his death, he elaborated his critique of clear, steady evolution.
A prolific writer of books and essays, Gould wrote a monthly viewpoint in
³Natural History.² Among his most successful books was ³Wonderful Life²
(1989) in which he offered data about the Burgess Shale in the Canadian
Rockies. He described the 570 million year old soft-bodied fossils first
discovered in 1909 and interpreted as ancestors of a modern group.
Using a 1971 restudy which revealed quite different results; these fossils
seem anatomically to exceed the entire spectrum of invertebrate life in
today¹s oceans. In addition the fossils contains 20 to 30 arthropods that
do not fit into any known group. From that analysis, Gould devotes over 300
pages to attacking the Darwin linear, continuous perspective.
Despite the popularity of his ideas, the number of his scholarly followers
does not seem high. Although several geneticists have collaborated with
him, much of the published criticisms appears to be by geneticists. As a
largely mathematicized profession, they seem to follow Darwin¹s path.
Meteorologist Edward N. Lorenz gave a 1972 paper ³Does the Flap of a
Butterfly¹s Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas.² That paper is
considered one of the major sources of the chaos perspective. It was based
on his many efforts at weather prediction. In trying to learn why there
were so few long-range successes, he concluded that initial conditions were
influential in affecting later outcomes--at times, becoming completely
unpredictable.
Along with sensitive dependence on initial conditions is irregularity or
erratic fluctuations. These features have been noted in the flow of rivers
and the shape of landscapes. Chemists have reported such chaos in fluids,
wave motion, and oscillating chemical reactions. Galaxies, solar systems,
and planets have been described as having erratic movements and orbits.
Of many thousands of scientists from many fields of science over many
centuries only a few have been mentioned. Nevertheless, the transition from
certainty to uncertainty, from determinism to indeterminism is clear. That
outcome is evidenced in the title of a 1980 lecture by Stephen Hawking, ³Is
the End in Sight for Theoretical Physics?².
The social sciences have gone through a somewhat similar but later
changeover. Fewer persons in fewer disciplines were involved but the overall
shift also is demonstrable. Contemporary social scientists also live in
this age of chance, though not so noticeably as physical scientists.
Like the founders of the physical sciences, the early predecessors of the
social sciences lived in Great Britain. Like them, Protestantism was
their religion and a God created social milieu was their view of the world.
Economics was the among the earliest perceived to offer determinist
explanations. Among the highly certain concepts appearing over the years
were ³absolute value,² ³law of diminishing returns,² ³law of supply and
demand,² ³iron law of wages,² and many more. Despite recent evidence of
economic uncertainties, some indexes to current economics textbooks still
contain a number of these supposed ³laws.²
The term Scottish Moralists has been used to describe 18th century
Protestant scholar-predecessors of social science. Writings about them
usually deal with eight very distinguished authors. They are described as a
connected group who substantially influenced each other.
Especially influential among them was Adam Smith, whose ideas were important
in their scope and depth. His Philosophical Essays contain his history of
astronomy which reveals his understanding of the orderly outlook of the
emerging sciences.
Throughout his writings are his beliefs in a fixed, ordained world. Its
religious foundations are evidenced frequently. Along with references to
God are: Author of nature, Creator, Providence, invisible hand, and
vice-regent of God (referring to one¹s internal beliefs and attitudes).
His fame began with the publication in 1759 of his ³The Theory of the Moral
Sentiments.² In it, he described an innate sympathy in human relationships,
dominating all other natural sentiments. By that he meant the human ability
to understand the feelings of others.
Not widely recognized for a sociological view of the world, especially by
economists, Adam Smith¹s discussion of the moral sentiments offered such an
explanation. Important for later social scientists is his interpretation of
how and why human beings everywhere live in groups.
Certainly, we share a social bond with many simpler animals. Still, why is
there such a ³propensity?² To Adam Smith, it was simply a God made
characteristic of human beings. His description of the human ability to put
oneself in the role of others and to feel as they do is basic to modern
social psychology. Self-interest is not viewed as a moral premise. He saw
³natural selfishness and rapacity² among the rich, but not as being moral.
Unfortunately, that volume appears unknown to some economists.
³The Wealth of Nations² has been a central concern to many of them. It was
a comprehensive economic analysis, dealing with issues of productivity,
money, market prices, wages, profit, and rent. The division of labor was
presented as a basic source of a nation¹s wealth. To Smith, its roots are a
³propensity in human nature...to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for
another.²
That propensity is one of many features of the market place which appear as
part of the actions of an ³invisible hand.² Though some modern economists
view that as the self-regulating nature of the market place, it can be
viewed as his deistic outlook. That parallels his early use of the
invisible hand as part of his explanation of regularities in astronomy as
well as in the alleged stabilizing tendency of the market place.
Gianni Vaggi¹s 2003 history of economic thought contends that ³Smith¹s
analysis of civil societies is far more complicated than the simple
self-interest plus free competition often attributed to his economic work.²
The book¹s index cites neither quantum or chaos theories nor one of the
other five markers of modern science. Others do so.
An 18th century group in France called the physiocrats were very aware of
Adam Smith¹s contributions. They were most interested in his restrictions
on the role of government in the economy. The concept of laissez-faire is
attributed to them. However, preferences by some of them of land over
industry as economic benefits limited their appeal.
Also influenced by reading ³The Wealth of Nations,² Thomas Malthus is best
known for his 1798 essay on population. Ordained as a minister in the
Church of England, he soon became a professor of history and political
economy. To him, linking political to economic matters made such studies
overly political and insufficiently mathematical.
He traced the recurrent economic crises of his times to its rapidly growing
population. ³The power of population is indefinitely greater than the power
of the earth to produce subsistence...population, when unchecked, increases
in a geometric ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetic ratio.²
That deterministic prediction was widely accepted for many years.
Only misery and poverty were nature¹s way to limit the size of humanity. To
him, the ³law² of diminishing returns prevented agriculture from any
increase in its productivity. The result could be only recurrent crises.
That vision was one of the sources of the label ³the dismal science² for
economics.
Rejecting both deist and excessive population interpretations as basic
forces, Karl Marx was equally a determinist. For him, the underlying laws
of change were economic conditions. These were inevitable sequences of
societal changes in modes of production and distribution. In his many
books, articles, and manifestos, Marx offered detailed and comprehensive
analyses of social systems.
His 1859 ³Critique of Political Economy² proposed an explanation of those
laws of historic change. Each economic stage could exist only until a
superior one would replace it. To him, the stages were; feudalism,
capitalism, socialism, and communism. Early stages contained the seeds of
their own destruction.
One of many ³internal contradictions² of capitalism was its inevitable
³alienation² of workers resulting from their having no control over their
work or their products. Another was capitalist profits creating the
difference between the value of the workers¹ pay and their income from all
the goods produced. The economic outcome would be inability of all workers
to purchase all their products.
These and other inevitable conditions would lead to worker organizations.
Their small and local unions would combine into larger groups opposing
capitalists who control the political arena. From simple struggles, the
workers will eventually rebel and gain control of the state. While some of
these events came into being. the fate of communist nations obviously has
not turned out as predicted.
Later social scientists have been called near indeterminate or near
determinate. They refer to theories rather than laws, to forecasts rather
than predictions, and probabilities rather than certainties.
That is characteristic of two leading 20th century economists, John Maynard
Keynes and Milton Friedman. Otherwise, they are as far apart as two
economists could be. The former strongly favored government intervention
when useful in the economy; the latter opposed virtually all government
actions.
Especially influential was Keynes¹ 1936 ³General Theory of Employment,
Interest, and Money.² One of its important theories involves the benefits
of government spending or ³investment² during economic downturns. That
spending would generate increased employment and thence more purchasing. In
turn, that added demand for goods would lead to greater production. Known
as ³Keynesian policy,² that idea has been favored by advocates of liberalism
and attacked by conservatives.
Overall, Keynsian economics has been described as a fiscal perspective, that
is, relating to government spending and taxation. Its focus is upon their
expected effects upon the general economy.
Very different are the economic theories of Milton Friedman. Central to his
views is his distrust of government. Although seen as a ³monetarist,² he
considered monetarist officials, like all government officials to be sources
of economic instability. In addition, Friedman sees inherent uncertainties
in economic predictions as well as lag times between recommendations and
their implementation.
Monetarism remains his rallying cry. He asserts that the supply of money
is critical to economic well-being. To him, the quantity of available money
is necessary for the national income, prices, and production. Concerned
over interest rates, unemployment, inflation and deflation, Friedman argued
for a slow and measured response to influence the money supply.
In this last great economic disagreement over the applicability of fiscal
versus monetary theories, it is clear that determinism has lost. Laws are
absent and theories prevail. Statistical probabilities are the measures of
competing sets of data. Uncertainties are widespread. And chance is not
ruled out.
The development of sociology from the age of certainty to the age of chance
resembles its forerunners in limited ways. Only considered a unity since
the mid-19th century, sociology has lagged behind them in many ways.
Although some of its theoretical predecessors were affected by the
Protestant ethic, most of its founders were not. Nor do many current
practitioners of sociology show much evidence of this age of chance.
The name ³sociology² was coined by a Catholic, Isidore Auguste Marie
Francois Xavier Comte in 1839. His voluminous writings aimed at the whole
range of human knowledge. In them, he proposed a ³law of the three stages.²
These were: 1) the theoretical or fictitious; 2) metaphysical or abstract;
3) scientific or positive.
He also called this field ³social physics² which he divided into ³social
statics² and ³social dynamics.² Comte sought to formulate general
propositions about both areas of sociology. However, much of his writings
treated with the methods of sociology. They included observation,
experiment, and comparative techniques.
Comte¹s overall goal was to arrive at sufficient knowledge for ³prevision.²
He asserted that sociological knowledge would allow deliberate policies of
intervention in social processes. However, he believed that the eventual
progress of humanity was predetermined by natural law.
Barely a few decades later, Herbert Spencer published the three volumes of
his ³Principles of Sociology.² A prolific writer, his explaining and
amplifying those principles was to occupy most of the next forty years. A
contemporary of Darwin, his own theory of evolution was basic to them.
Unlike Darwin, Spencer believed that evolution was cyclical. Changes which
occurred were attributed to a universal principle in terms of equilibration.
He compared groups and societies to organisms which developed like them. He
used the term ³superorganic² to characterize what modern social scientists
call culture.
Spencer firmly opposed governmental interference with private actions, with
the exception of preserving freedom. He believed that legislation could not
correct social problems and that social structures evolved naturally. He
compared the development of social entities to that of plants and animals,
affected by internal and external forces.
Writing in the later decades of the 19th century and early decades of the
20th, Vilfredo Pareto reveals scant awareness of the arriving uncertainty.
He described society, like physics, as a system in equilibrium. His 1916
³Mind and Society² contended that individual acts are not guided by logic.
To Pareto, rationality appears only as numbers increase. Hence, mathematics
is applicable to the actions of society because bias, illusions, and emotion
are less likely. The ensuing equilibrium of forces is what makes possible a
natural science of society.
Like Adam Smith and others, Vilfredo Pareto has made important contributions
to both economics and sociology. A major concern has been economic
equilibrium. He argued that conventional utility theories were not
rigorously defined. What is called a Pareto optimum was his alternative.
That refers to his efforts at balancing of the needs of the various
consumers in the marketplace.
While these 19th century sociologists carried on a somewhat deterministic
outlook, German historians, philosophers, and humanists were differentiating
their views as ³verstehende² or understanding of human beings. Some
sociologists began to distinguish their field from the Naturwissenschaften
or natural sciences. In their view, sociology had to be a
Geisteswissenschaften, the study of human minds or spirits. Foremost among
them was Max Weber.
Born little more than a decade after Pareto, Weber was much influenced by
his devoutly Calvinist mother. Inculcated with her ethics, such as working
hard, along with the verstehende method, undoubtedly helped lead to his
famed ³The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.²
In his view, sociology had to use interpretive understanding of social
behavior in order to explain its causes and effects. That requirement of
interpretative understanding was a distinct break from demonstrable,
replicable evidence for prior scientific acceptability.
Conversely, his ³value-free neutrality² may appear more appropriate to the
objective standards of scientific evidence. Still, he contended that values
always are involved in the selection of topics. Once chosen, each topic
must examined completely and impartially.
What places him most clearly with the modernists is his conception of
causality. In dealing with human beings, interpretations are limited to
probabilities not certainties.
Remaining for discussion are two mid-twentieth century sociologists for whom
my point of view may differ from the others. As a former graduate student
of each of them at different universities, my personal experiences affect my
judgment about them. On the other hand is the advantage of having had
face-to-face experiences with them.
At mid-20th century, both followed long but divergent traditions of American
sociology. Herbert Blumer was very greatly influenced by philosopher George
Herbert Mead in espousing the interpretive, subjective, and less certain
mode of interpretation. Greatly affected by methodologist Paul Lazarsfeld,
Robert Merton accepted a positivist outlook, expecting increased and assured
knowledge in the future.
The term ³symbolic interaction² was coined by Blumer to describe a very
distinctive view of social phenomena. Central are the meanings of words,
objects, and behavior in all human relationships. These meanings are
learned from parents, friends, teachers, books, and all others that we
encounter. In these relationships, meanings are created and recreated.
The importance of meanings and their implications make it extremely
difficult to predict human behavior. As groups and nations contain many
members, it becomes especially hard to anticipate their policies and their
actions. The outcome is a viewpoint difficult to portray and specify.
As a lecturer, Blumer was outstanding and inspiring. His writings were
sparse, frequently focusing on the difficulties of doing sociology.
³Science Without Concepts² and ³What is Wrong With Social Theory² were
influential articles that demonstrate the uncertainties in sociological
analysis.
Many years later, my close friend Bernard Meltzer and I published a
reader-textbook ³Symbolic Interaction² (3rd ed., 1978). Its contents are
among the forerunners of this essay.
Another of the great lecturers in my experience was Robert Merton. In
addition, he was an original thinker and a highly articulate and prolific
writer. In his many books and articles, he formulated original and well
balanced proposals and predictions.
Merton portrayed sociology as centuries behind the physical sciences but
that in due time it would achieve a high level of theoretical and
methodological greatness. He contended that sociologists should be content
with empirical generalizations and theories of the middle range. Later
would come advanced knowledge.
A main interest was clarifying functional analysis, an earlier idea that all
social entities were functional. He added terms like dysfunctional as well
as manifest and latent function to improve its applicability. Other terms
which he introduced to the sociological vocabulary were discrepancies,
contradictions, and unanticipated consequences of purposive social actions.
While these concepts reflect some recognition of uncertainty, most of the
published articles and books by Merton show scant awareness of the new 20th
century perspective. His views must be termed somewhat deterministic. A
1996 book ³Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences² does not contain his name in
the bibliography.
The book¹s 13 articles do show some social science evidence of chaos.
Articles on ³Nonlinear Politics² and ³Chaos Theory and Rationality in
Economics² are interesting studies in this newer mode of analysis.
So will there be prosperity or depression ahead? War of peace? And in
invading Iraq, why did the head of America¹s defense department send only
half the armed force recommended by the head of his military?
These are clear signs of uncertainty. They raise an important question:
Is the age of chance only a result of better knowledge or have all the
markers of chance also been increasing? Specifically, has there been more
chance, indeterminism, probability, uncertainty, and unpredictability?
Some answers may lie in another 20th century change--globalization. With two
world wars, aircraft travel, electronic communication, and vast increases in
international trade, globalization is far different from its earlier forms.
Along with it is more evidence of the age of chance.
Consider the butterfly effect, that is, sensitive dependence upon initial
occurrences. Originating in meteorology, it is especially applicable to
this enlargement of world-wide interdependence. Internationalization of
AIDS is an example. The appearance in China of SARS and its spread to Canada
and other countries also is illustrative.
A 1995 book ³Jihad vs.McWorld² offered an analysis of some unexpected
effects of globalization. Among the very serious outcomes was the ensuing
conflict of modern and traditional values. Traditionalists of all forms
have opposed a wide set of modern ³rights² and ³freedoms.² Among them:
rights of other groups, civil rights, and women¹s rights.
International agreements to eliminate world trade barriers already has had
many unexpected consequences. While the Americans who signed the agreements
might not have been surprised, many state governments and their residents
were surprised and angered. Indeed, such unanticipated occurrences most
often affect individuals and local governments.
During the past decade, there have been many such cases. Bans on polluting
gasoline additives against their manufacturers in America and Canada have
been overturned in each country against the other country. Among the
lawsuits against the United States filed under free trade have been Burma,
Canada, European Union, Venezuela and others.
Obviously, those who make the laws can know far more about their outcomes
than those who experience surprising effects. Similarly, the very affluent
can have more knowledge and influence about globalization and everything
else than the least affluent. Those born in poorer nations are more apt to
encounter the dubious effects of globalization.
For them, the age of chance offers few opportunities. For those in the more
affluent nations, there are much greater opportunities and greater awareness
of those opportunities. In this less deterministic era, there is more
uncertainty but also more chances. That means more freedom, more choices,
and, possibly, better luck.
Often the choices individuals face have uncertain consequences. To deal
with such situations, I return to advice from my gambler friend. ³I don¹t
gamble on dice because I have never found any way to beat the odds in it. I
learned a lot about poker which helps me with both good and bad luck.²
Winning big is great but their odds are very poor. Lotteries pay out only
about 65% of what they take in. Even slot machines pay back about 90%.
Only, the very lucky are most likely to come out ahead by gambling.
There are other choices with high risks, such as smoking and drinking while
driving. Of course, taking risks can be enjoyable. In dealing with risk, a
final quote from my influential and long ago gambling friend can be
appropriate. ³Find out as much as you can about what you are doing.² In
this age of chance, knowing that can be very helpful.
Knowing that chance and its corollaries are possible does not mean that
certainty and determinism will disappear. Certainly, the sighting of a
small sea horse led to this report on chance.
